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PURSUANT TO RULE 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner
Jodi Howick (“Howick”) submits this brief.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final action or order of
the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(6) (2007).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Howick presents the following issues for review by this Court:
I.

Whether the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board (the “Board”)

abused its discretion when it determined that Howick was not entitled to the
protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007) because she was allegedly an
at-will employee under the law.1 The standard for appellate review of this issue is
de novo for correctness pursuant to Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, ¶
11,122 P.3d 521. This issue was preserved by Howick's Notice of Appeal filed
July 1, 2008.
II.

Whether the Board abused its discretion by violating, and in effect

upholding a violation of, Howick’s due process rights pursuant to the Utah
Constitution Article 1, § 7. The standard for appellate review of this issue is de
novo for correctness pursuant to Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d

1

References to codes, ordinances, policies and procedures in this Brief refer to
those in effect in 2007.

1

23, 27 (Utah App. 1991). This issue was preserved by Howick's Notice of Appeal
filed July 1, 2008.
III.

Whether Howick is entitled to attorney fees and costs under this

Court’s inherent power in the interest of justice and equity and under the due
process provisions of the Utah Constitution. The standard for appellate review of
attorney fees issues constitutes a matter within this Court’s discretion pursuant to
Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 781-782 (Utah 1994);
Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2008 UT App 22, ¶ 10, 177 P.3d 621; and
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County School Dist., 2000 UT 87, ¶ 20,
16 P.3d 533. This issue could not be raised in the proceeding before the Board
because it is without authority to award fees. Salt Lake City Employee Appeals
Board Procedures I, C (the “Procedures”), attached as Appendix 2.
LAWS TO BE INTERPRETED
The following are constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal. The full text of the following citations is set forth in
Appendix 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2007).
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-702, 815 and 1221 (2007).
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 2.52.130 (2007).
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE §§ 2.53.020, 030 and 060 (2007).
2

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, POLICY 3.01.02 (2007).
Utah Constitution Article 1, § 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board denying Howick an appeal
from the termination of her employment by the Salt Lake City Attorney’s Office
in August 2007. The Utah Municipal Code requires cities to provide all but a few
categories of municipal employees an appeal if their employment is terminated.
Howick believed she was entitled to the protections of the Code, but the City
rebuffed her efforts to have the termination reconsidered. When Howick first
attempted to obtain a hearing before the Board, the Salt Lake City Labor Relations
Officer refused to forward her appeal to the Board on the grounds that Howick
was working in an alleged “at-will” position and was therefore not entitled to
appeal to the Board.
Howick appealed the City’s determination to this Court. This Court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Howick’s appeal because the Board
had not issued a final action due to the City's refusal to forward her appeal to the
Board. However, this Court noted that Howick could seek redress through an
extraordinary writ or other action to require the Board to determine whether it had
jurisdiction to hear her appeal.
Upon receipt of this Court’s decision, the City forwarded Howick’s appeal
to the Board. In response, the Board sought a legal opinion about whether
Howick’s position was an at-will position. Without considering any of Howick’s
3

legal arguments demonstrating that her position could not be made at-will by the
City, the Board decided that she was an at-will employee and not entitled to an
appeal. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Howick was employed by the City in the Salt Lake City Attorney’s Office
(“Attorney’s Office”) from 1992 to August 2007 as a staff attorney. R. 108-130.
In 1998, the Attorney’s Office purported to create a new “at-will” attorney
position outside of the City’s merit system. Staff attorneys were asked to agree to
move to the newly-created position in exchange for a raise in pay. Howick moved
to this position and signed a document titled “At-Will Employment Disclaimer” in
connection with the move. R. 63.
The newly-created position was titled “Appointed Senior City Attorney.”
The job description for the new position is substantially identical to the City’s
“Senior City Attorney” job description in its 600 Series Compensation Plan,
except that the “Appointed Senior City Attorney” description requires two
additional years of experience as a prerequisite for moving to that position and
identifies it as an at-will position. This new position was originally included as a
part of the City’s 600 Series Compensation Plan and was moved a few years later
to a newly-created pay plan called the Unclassified Compensation Plan. Most

4

staff attorneys in the Attorney’s Office work under the “Appointed Senior City
Attorney” job description.2 R. 48, 65-68
During her 15 years of service, Howick worked with many different City
managers and received outstanding performance evaluations. R. 110-130. Then
in August 2007, Howick’s supervisor, Ed Rutan (“Rutan”), City Attorney,
terminated her employment without any prior notice and without any cause
explicitly on the basis of her alleged at-will status and in violation of the
protections afforded to merit system employees by the Utah Municipal Code.
Rutan gave Howick no documentation. R. 108. Howick believed that her
termination violated the requirements of the Utah Municipal Code and asked
several times to meet with Rutan to discuss the basis of his action. However,
Rutan refused to meet with her. R. 48; Petitioner's Docketing Statement, Case No.
20070863, attached as Appendix 4, at Exhibit B.

2

City compensation plans and job descriptions are available at
http://www.slcgov.com/jobs. In July, 2008, the City changed its compensation
plans to place its Unclassified Compensation Plan in its Executive Compensation
Plan. See June 3, 2008 Salt Lake City Council Staff Report
www.slcgov.com/council/agendas (follow “June” hyperlink; then follow “Item
A10 Compensation Budget FY 08 09” hyperlink under the June 3, 2008 Staff
Report Attachments heading (last visited October 1, 2008)), attached as Appendix
3. See also Executive Compensation Plan (sections I, II, III, XVI, XVII and App.
A) www.slcgov.com/jobs (follow “City Compensation Plans” hyperlink; then
search for “Appointed Compensation”; follow match 6 hyperlink “Compensation
Plan for Salt Lake City Corporation Appointed Employees and Elected Officials
(last visited October 1, 2008)), also attached as Appendix 3. The “Appointed
Senior City Attorney” job description is currently classified under the Executive
Compensation Plan as “Level 003.” See Executive Compensation Plan, Appendix
3. The former Unclassified Compensation Plan is publicly available through the
Salt Lake City recorder’s Office.
5

On September 10, 2007, after being rebuffed in her efforts to discuss the
basis for her termination, including the legality of treating her as an at-will
employee, Howick filed a Notice of Appeal with the Salt Lake City Recorder to
obtain an appeal before the Board as required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(3)(a) and City ordinances and procedures. R. 108-130. The City’s Labor
Relations Officer, who staffs the Board in the appeal process, refused to initiate
the appeal process and instead obtained information relating to Howick’s former
position in the Attorney’s Office. The Labor Relations Officer's supervisor, as the
City’s acting Labor Relations Officer, then issued a letter stating that she had
“determined” that Howick was an at-will employee and therefore not entitled to an
appeal. Appendix 4, Exhibits A and B. Howick contacted the City pointing out
that the Labor Relations Officer’s action was contrary to both State law and City
ordinance and policy, but the City refused to refer Howick’s appeal to the Board.
Appendix 4, Exhibits B and C.
On October 22, 2007, Howick filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Case
No. 20070863, Notice of Appeal. The Court made a sua sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition to determine if it had jurisdiction over the appeal. The
Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Howick’s appeal because of the
refusal of the City to refer Howick’s appeal to the Board. The Court dismissed
Howick’s appeal, but noted in its decision that the City’s handling of Howick’s
appeal to the Board violated the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board
Procedures (the “Procedures”) and that Howick could seek redress through an
6

extraordinary writ or other action to require the Board to issue a final agency
decision on its own jurisdiction. See Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT
App 216, 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 212.
Upon receipt of this Court’s decision, the City referred Howick’s appeal to
the Board. The Board acknowledged receipt of the appeal on June 20, 2008.
R. 104. The Board informed Howick and the City that they could submit
documentation related to Howick’s appeal for consideration at the Board’s
meeting on June 26, 2008, but the Board permitted Howick no other participation
in its process. R. 74-76, 99-101, 104. Howick submitted a memorandum of law
arguing that she was entitled to the protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106
because her staff attorney position could not lawfully be made an at-will position.
R. 47-68. The City submitted a letter arguing that a court, and not the Board,
should determine whether Howick could be treated by the City as an at-will
employee. R. 27-46.
On July 1, 2008, pursuant to its Procedures, the Board requested a legal
opinion regarding whether Howick was properly classified as an at-will employee
from the City Attorney. R. 96; Procedures III.G at Appendix 2. The City
Attorney retained special counsel of his choosing, Stanley Preston (“Preston”), to
provide the requested opinion. R. 94-95. The opinion found that Howick's
position could legally be classified as an at-will position without addressing
Howick’s legal contentions regarding the City’s authority and the requirements of
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 ("Section 10-3-1105") and 1106 ("Section 10-31106"). R. 81-87.
On July 15, 2008, in a meeting lasting approximately two minutes, three of
five members of the Board met and decided to adopt the conclusions of the special
counsel selected by the City Attorney. R. Exhibit A at 2-3. The Board decided
that based on Howick’s alleged at-will status, she was not entitled to the
protections of Section 10-3-1106, thereby upholding the at-will termination of
Howick’s employment. R. Exhibit A at 3. The Board certified its decision to the
Salt Lake City Recorder on July 15, 2008, R. 73, and Howick filed a Notice of
Appeal to this Court on July 18, 2008.
The Board met in closed sessions. R. 99-101; 74-76. Howick was
permitted no participation in the proceedings before the Board, other than
submitting her memorandum. She was not given access to the Preston opinion
until Board staff provided Howick with a copy of the record on August 7, 2008,
three weeks after the Board's decision. Letter from Shelly Chapman, Salt Lake
City Corporation, August 7, 2008, attached as Appendix 5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The Board abused its discretion when it determined that Howick was

not entitled to the protections of Section 10-3-1106. Rather, the City exceeded the
statutory authority granted to it under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 and violated
the Utah Municipal Code and City requirements when it classified Howick’s
employment at-will, terminated her employment on the basis of this alleged at-will
8

status and denied her the protections of Section 10-3-1106. The City cannot
violate or exceed its authority under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 by any means,
whether by ordinance, policy, procedure or contract, and it cannot circumvent the
requirements of its own ordinances mandating that the City follow these statutes.
Consistent with this Court’s previous determinations, municipal actions that
exceed their authority are void and cannot be given any effect. The City was
obligated to comply with statutory provisions in its rules and in its dealings with
its employees, and Howick had the right to expect that the City would. The Board
decision should therefore be reversed and Howick should be reinstated and
awarded back pay and benefits.
II.

The City, the Board, and the Board staff also violated Howick’s

rights to due process. Howick had a property interest in her employment created
by State law and was therefore entitled to pre and post termination due process.
She received neither. Due process also requires that the proceedings provided by
the Board be meaningful and fair, and they were not. A violation of due process
by a Utah governmental agency is an abuse of discretion, and also requires the
Board's decision to be reversed and Howick to be reinstated with back pay and
benefits.
III.

Howick is entitled to attorney fees under this Court’s inherent power

in the interest of justice and equity pursuant to the private attorney general
doctrine and for acts by the City that were in bad faith, vexatious, wanton and for
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oppressive reasons. She is also entitled to attorney fees under the due process
provisions of the Utah Constitution Article 1, § 7.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING
THAT HOWICK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS
OF SECTION 10-3-1106 BASED ON HER ALLEGED AT-WILL
STATUS.
A.

MISINTERPRETING THE LAW IS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

This Court reviews the Board’s final action to determine if the Board
“abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.” Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(6)(c). The Board requested a legal opinion “about whether the conversion of
Ms. Howick’s position to an ‘at-will’ position was done appropriately.” R. 96.
Based on the legal opinion it received, the Board determined that “it did not have
the authority to review the appeal of Ms. Howick” because Howick was an “atwill” employee. Final Action, R. 73.3
The Board thus found it had no jurisdiction by adopting a legal conclusion
that the protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 did not apply to Howick. “In
cases where the basic question is what does the law require? the standard is a
correction of error standard.” Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23,
28 (Ut. App. 1991) (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811
P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991). When “a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of
3

While Mr. Buckley’s letter states that the vote of the Board was unanimous, only
three of the five Board members were present. See Final Action, R. 73;
Attestation, R. 75.
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discretion and thereby crossed the law, we review using a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the tribunal’s legal determination. We give no
deference to such decisions because we are in as good a position as the tribunal to
determine the law. Obviously the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is
an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting the law.” Id. at
27. 4
B.

THE BOARD MISINTERPRETED STATE LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT HOWICK'S POSITION WAS AT-WILL.

Howick’s position cannot be made at-will under the Utah Municipal Code,
and thus she cannot be denied the protections of Section 10-3-1106. The Utah
State Legislature has created protections for municipal employees and mandated
restrictions on municipal employment actions under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.
Under those mandates, “[e]xcept as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of
a municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to
discharge . . . only as provided in Section 10-3-1106.” Utah Code Ann. § 10-31105(1) (emphasis added). Among the rights included in Section 10-3-1106, “[i]f
an employee is discharged . . . the employee may . . . appeal the discharge . . . to a
board to be known as the employee appeal board . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(2)(a).

4

This Court noted that when it acts to correct a misinterpretation of law, it is
finding an abuse of discretion by the tribunal. Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27.
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Subsection 10-3-1105(2) states, “[s]ubsection (1) [the grant of protected
employment] does not apply to [the specifically listed employees in Subsections
(2)(a) – (l)].” Utah Code Ann. § 1105(2) (emphasis added.) This statutory
language is unequivocal. It expressly grants the protections of Section 10-3-1106
to each employee of a municipality except when the employee is in a position
enumerated in the list of exceptions in Section 10-3-1105(2). The Utah Supreme
Court has stated:
When interpreting statutory law, our “primary goal . . . is to give
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.” We also
“assume that each term included in the [statute] was used advisedly.”
Mouty v. Sandy City, 2005 UT 41, ¶ 17, 122 P.3d 521 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
Courts look to the plain language of a statute when interpreting statutory
law. The plain language of Section 10-3-1105 does not exempt Howick’s former
position with Salt Lake City from statutory protections. The employees listed in
Subsection (2) are: an officer of the City appointed by the mayor or by the
comparable person or body in other forms of municipal government,5 a police or
fire department employee, a police chief or deputy police chief, a fire chief or

5

The City does not contend that Howick was an officer of the City, and neither
could she have been one. As defined in the Salt Lake City Code, the term
“’officer’ means and includes officers and boards in charge of departments and the
members of such boards.” Salt Lake City, Utah, Code § 1.04.010(C)(12). As one
of numerous staff attorneys for the City, Howick was not in charge of the City
Attorney’s Office or any other department.
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deputy or assistant fire chief, a department head or deputy department head, a
superintendent, or a probationary, part-time or seasonal employee. Howick was
employed as a staff attorney in the City Attorney’s Office for 15 years under a job
description used by many members of that Office. This position is not included
within the list at Subsection (2).
Courts also assume that each term in a statute is used advisedly. The
language of Subsection 10-3-1105(2) is drafted precisely, and the Legislature used
its terms advisedly. For example, when the Legislature amended this section in
2004, it specifically added the term “assistant” to Subsection 1105(2)(f) in order to
include an “assistant fire chief” on the list of employees not subject to statutory
protections. Minutes of the Senate Government Operations & Political
Subdivisions Standing Committee (January 23, 2004)
http://www.le.state.us/~2004/minutes/SGOP0123.pdf. See also Minutes of the
House Political Subdivisions Standing Committee (January 30, 2004)
http://www.le.state.us/~2004/minutes/HPOL0130.pdf (amendment introduced at
urging of Utah League of Cities and Towns). The Legislature did not contemplate
that other positions, such as this “assistant fire chief” position, could be denied
statutory protections unless they were expressly added to the list.6

6

Other governmental entities also recognize that a position may not be removed
from a statutory merit employment system without Legislative authorization. For
example, when the State of Utah wanted to remove certain information technology
positions from the state merit system, it pursued an amendment to add Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19-15(1)(t) in 2005. When Salt Lake County wanted to remove
division directors who report to an elected official from its merit system at the
13

The Legislature’s express list of exemptions at Section 10-3-1105 cannot be
interpreted to include employment positions that the Legislature omitted. The
Utah Supreme Court has stated, “‘statutory construction presumes that the
expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.’ Thus, we
should give effect to any omission in the ordinance language by presuming that
the omission is purposeful.” Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 30, 104
P.3d 1208 (quoting Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ¶ 14, 993 P.2d
875). The Legislature placed specific and intentionally selected positions on its
list at Subsection 10-3-1105(2), omitting all others, and Howick’s position is not
listed.
Under the plain language of the statute, Howick’s position falls under the
broad mandate of Subsection (1) requiring that each employee of a municipality
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge only as
provided in Section 10-3-1106 and having a right to appeal a discharge. The
Legislature has not exempted Howick’s position from the statutory protections of
Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and she is therefore entitled to them.

urging of the Salt Lake District Attorney, the Legislature permitted that change,
but grandfathered existing employees in those division director positions. See
Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-1 (2008); S.B. 78, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2008). See also
D.A. makes case for – cronyism?, S.L. Tribune, Feb. 10, 2008. No such changes
have ever been made to the municipal merit system to permit a city to deny a
municipal staff attorney position the protections of Section 10-3-1106.
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C.

SALT LAKE CITY CANNOT EXCEED ITS STATUTORY
AUTHORITY AND VIOLATE THE UTAH MUNICIPAL
CODE REGARDLESS OF THE MEANS IT USES, AND ITS
ATTEMPTS TO DO SO ARE VOID.

Through its ordinances, policies, procedures, and contracts, Salt Lake City
has repeatedly attempted to give itself the power to create at-will positions and
deny City employees statutory protections in violation of statute and in excess of
the power granted by the Legislature under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.
However, regardless of the means it uses, the City cannot violate the mandates of
the Legislature and exceed its statutory authority. “Whatever power or authority
municipalities in this state have is derived from the Legislature.” Salt Lake City v.
Sutter, 216 P. 234, 237 (Utah 1923). “Local governments, as subdivisions of the
State, exercise those powers granted to them by the State Legislature, [citing
cases] and the exercise of a delegated power is subject to the limitations imposed
by state statutes and state and federal constitutions.” Harding v. Alpine City, 656
P.2d 985, 986 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah
1980)). Since Salt Lake City, as a political subdivision of the State, is a creature
of statute, its powers are limited to those found in statute. The City is thus bound
by the mandates of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and it cannot make Howick an
at-will employee in violation of law and in excess of the scope of its powers under
those statutes.
If the City attempts to circumvent the Legislature’s directives, the City’s
acts are void. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation . . . . Of every municipal
corporation the charter or statute by which it is created is its organic
act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act, or make
any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized thereby, or by
some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond the scope of
the powers granted are void.
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P. at 235 (emphasis omitted) quoting 1 Dillon on
Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 237. While Utah courts no longer strictly
construe a legislative grant of general welfare power to local governments, “local
governments are without authority to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in
conflict with, state statutory law.” Hutchinson, 624 P.2d at 1121.7
Provisions of law that are illegal and void cannot be given any effect. This
Court has stated that when it encounters such provisions, whether in the form of a
regulation, rule or otherwise, or actions taken pursuant to them, this Court has “a
duty to invalidate them.” Draughon v. Dept. of Fin. Inst., 1999 UT App 42, ¶ 5,
975 P.2d 935. (quoting Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119,
1122 (Utah App. 1988). See also, Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46, 49 (Utah App.
1989).

7

City actions cannot be “directly prohibited by, or . . . inconsistent with the policy
of, the state or federal laws or the constitution of this State or of the United
States.” Id. at 1126.
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1.

Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory
Authority By Ordinance.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-702 affirms that, “[t]he governing body may pass
any ordinance to regulate, require, prohibit, govern, control or supervise any
activity, business, conduct or condition authorized by this act or any other
provision of law.” (Emphasis added.) While municipalities may pass ordinances,
they may only do so to the extent those ordinances are authorized by the Utah
Municipal Code or other provisions of law. “It is well established that, where a
city ordinance is in conflict with a state statute, the ordinance is invalid at its
inception.” Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, ¶ 15, 116 P.3d 290 (finding Salt Lake
City ordinance invalid to the extent that it permitted what state law prohibited.)8
The Legislature’s mandates at Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 are express
limitations on the power that a city is authorized to exercise, and the City cannot
exceed them.
In its ordinances, Salt Lake City states that any employee has the right to
appeal a discharge pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 except “a) those
employees set forth in section 10-3-1105(2) . . . and b) at-will employees. . . .”
Salt Lake City Code § 2.52.130 (emphasis added). This ordinance provision
purports to give the City power to create “at-will” positions exempt from statutory

8

Even when a city acts under a general welfare clause, specific grants of power
“may serve to limit the means available under the general welfare clause, for some
limitation may be imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use of power
in a particular manner.” Hutchinson, 624 P.2d at 1126.
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protections in addition to those allowed by the Legislature in Subsection 10-31105(2). This provision exceeds the Legislature’s statutory grant of authority and
violates Section 10-3-1105, and as such it is void.
2.

Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory
Authority By Policies and Procedures.

Salt Lake City has also adopted policies and procedures by which it
attempts to give itself an expanded power to create at-will positions. However,
just as a city cannot use an ordinance to violate the law or exceed the scope of its
statutory authority, it likewise cannot do so by using a policy or procedure.
An administrative agency’s authority to promulgate regulations is
limited to those regulations which are consonant with the statutory
framework, and neither contrary to the statute nor beyond its scope.
Administrative regulations may not conflict with the design of an
Act, and when they do the court has a duty to invalidate them . . .
Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a statute
and issues a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess
of administrative authority granted . . . Agency regulations may not
abridge, enlarge, extend or modify [a] statute . . . .
Draughon, 1999 UT App 42 at ¶ 5 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). See
also Lorenc, 789 P.2d at 49 (a policy more restrictive than a rule promulgated
under a statute abrogates the Legislature’s objective, and “[w]hen such
administrative regulations and policies ‘conflict with the design of an Act,’ we
have a duty to invalidate them” (citation omitted)).
These City policies and procedures also violate other sections of State law,
including an express mandate that the Legislature imposes on cities to follow the
requirements of the Legislature’s merit employment plan. Utah Code Ann. § 10-
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3-1221 states, “[e]ach officer [of a city] shall have the power to prescribe rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with general law, the municipal administrative code
[the city’s ordinances], and the merit plan” (emphasis added). Likewise, under
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, “[t]he governing body of each municipality shall
prescribe rules and regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this
state, as it deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation,
conduct, and business of the municipality.” (Emphasis added.)
Salt Lake City Policy 3.01.02 ("City Policies 3.01.01")attempts to define atwill positions by stating, “[a]t-will positions are: A. Executive employees who
report directly to the Mayor or a Department Director; B. Unclassified Employees;
C. Part-time and seasonal employees; and, D. Regular employees who have not
yet completed their probationary period.” This policy makes no reference to
Section 10-3-1105, and it designates employees without regard for that section’s
statutory requirements. To the extent it designates positions as at-will which are
not listed in Section 10-3-1105(2), it is void.
Further, in the Salt Lake City’s Employee Appeal Board Procedures, the
City states that its appeal process is available to “each employee of the City”
except those in thirteen listed positions. Procedures I, E, Appendix 2.. For ease of
comparison, the positions excepted by Section 10-3-1105(2) are set forth below
next to the City’s list.
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City Procedures

Section 10-3-1105(2)

1. an officer appointed by the (a) an officer appointed by the mayor or
Mayor or the Mayor’s
other person or body exercising
designee;
executive power in the municipality;
2. a member of the police
department or fire
department who is a
member of the classified
civil service;

(b) a member of the municipality's
police department or fire department
who is a member of the classified
civil service in a first or second
class city;

3. a police chief;

(c) a police chief of the municipality;

4. a deputy police chief;

(d) a deputy police chief of the
municipality;

5. a fire chief;

(e) a fire chief of the municipality;

6. a deputy or assistant fire
chief;

(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the
municipality;

7. a head of a City
department;

(g) a head of a municipal department;

8. a deputy head of a City
department;

(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal
department;

9. a superintendent;

(i) a superintendent;

10. a probationary employee;

(j) a probationary employee of the
municipality;

11. an hourly part-time
employee;

(k) a part-time employee of the
municipality; or

12. seasonal employee; or

(l) a seasonal employee of the
municipality.

13. any other at-will
employee.
The City’s list follows the State statute with two exceptions. First, the City
attempts to expand its powers under its first exception beyond the Legislature’s
mandate that exempted officers are those appointed by the mayor or the
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comparable person or body in other forms of municipal government. Second, the
City’s thirteenth exception is not contained in the statute. Like City Policy
3.01.02, this section of the Procedures attempts to give the City the ability to
create at-will positions without regard for statutory requirements. Like City Policy
3.01.02, it violates State statutory requirements under Sections 10-3-1105 and 103-1106, and under Sections 10-3-1221 and 10-3-815, and to that extent it is void.
3.

Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory
Authority By Contract.

In addition to violating State requirements through ordinances, policies, and
procedures, Salt Lake City also attempts to give itself an expanded power to
designate at-will positions in violation of Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 by
contract. However, all of Salt Lake City’s contractual efforts to create at-will
positions and deny statutory protections in violation of Sections 10-3-1105 and 103-1106 are void. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that cities cannot exceed
statutory restrictions on their powers by using contracts. “Neither the corporation
nor its officers can do any act, or make any contract . . . not authorized [by the
statutes creating the city].” Sutter, 216 P. at 235 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a governmental entity’s personnel
policies constitute contracts, not legislative acts, and that a governmental entity
lacks authority to promulgate such contracts in contravention of Utah statutory
law. University of Utah v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51, ¶¶ 26, 28 and 56, 144 P.3d
1109 (finding that university personnel policies were contractual and could not
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restrict firearms in contravention of statute). Further, public employees have the
right to expect that their employers will create contracts that comply with the law.
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d at 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995 (quoting
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992)) (employee
wrongfully terminated since “[t]he County had an obligation to comply with the
statutory provisions . . . in writing its manual and dealing with employees, and
Thurston had the right to expect that the County would”). See also, Brummitt v.
Ogden Waterworks Co., 93 P. 828 (Utah 1908) (portions of municipal contracts
that exceed statutory powers are void, although other portions of the contract may
be enforced).
In this case, Salt Lake City has issued contracts in the form of policies,
procedures, compensation plans, job descriptions and disclaimers all purporting to
designate positions as at-will without regard to Section 10-3-1105(2). Under some
of these documents, the City specifically designates Howick’s position as being atwill. The City also argues that Howick signed one such document in 1998
agreeing that her position would thereafter be designated as at-will. As
demonstrated above, the City cannot circumvent State law by contract because
such contracts, whether issued as a general personnel policy or entered into with a
specific person, exceed the City’s authority and are void and unenforceable.
The Preston opinion advised the Board that the City has the power to
exceed statutory limitations on its powers through the use of contracts, but this
argument is clearly in error. As Preston notes, a city may voluntarily undertake an
22

additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation to perform, but its acts
cannot be “inconsistent with the underlying statute.” Preston Opinion, R. 85.
Additional contractual rights “[can] not alter or contradict an employee’s statutory
rights.” Code v. Utah Dep’t. of Health, 2007 UT App 390, ¶6, 174 P.2d 1134
(quoting Buckner v. Rennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 32, n.4, 99 P.3d 842).
Preston also advised the Board that if municipal employee rights can be
expanded by contract, it follows that Howick could waive statutory and
constitutional employment protections. Preston Opinion, R. 86. Again, this
argument is clearly in error. As Preston noted, this issue involves “whether the
City could ask Ms. Howick to agree to waive those statutory rights.” Preston
Opinion, R. 85. The law clearly prohibits the City from exceeding its authority,
and Howick cannot give to the City powers that the Legislature expressly withheld
for the protection of city employees. Howick cannot give the City the power to
circumvent a legislative policy. “Whatever power or authority municipalities in
this state have is derived from the Legislature.” Sutter, 216 P. at 237 (emphasis
added).9 “Local governments . . . exercise those powers granted to them by the

9

See also Druffner v. Mrs. Fields, Inc., 828 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Utah App. 1992)
(finding that a waiver and release agreement purporting to release claims arising
from employment, including Fair Labor Standards Act claims, was unenforceable
as a matter of law as against public policy; “contracts tending to encourage
violation of laws are void as contrary to public policy . . . To permit an employer
to secure a release from the worker . . . will tend to nullify the deterrent effect
which Congress plainly intended that [FLSA] should have. Knowledge on the part
of the employer that he cannot escape liability . . . by taking advantage of the
needs of his employees tends to insure compliance in the first place.” (Citations
omitted)). See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985)
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State Legislature . . . .” Harding v. Alpine City, 656 P.2d at 986 (emphasis
added).
Salt Lake City cannot circumvent the limitations on its powers or violate
the mandates of the Utah Municipal Code by asking for Howick's agreement.
Where the Legislature gives the City no power to act, Howick cannot provide it.
Instead, the City has “an obligation to comply with the statutory provisions” in its
employment practices, and Howick has “the right to expect that the County [City]
would.” Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038.
Salt Lake City cannot use any means to avoid or violate the mandates of
Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 and other provisions of State code, and all of
the City’s efforts to do so are void. Irrespective of the manner of implementation,
whenever the City exceeds its statutory authority or violates the law, its acts are
void, and this Court has a duty to invalidate those provisions of City ordinances,
policies, procedures, and contracts, and actions taken pursuant to them.

(finding that where a household exclusion clause impacted minimum liability
coverages mandated by state statute for operating a motor vehicle, it was “contrary
to the public policy of this state and the statutory requirements found in the NoFault Insurance Act as to the minimum benefits provided by statute[,]” and the
contract clause thus was invalid.); Code, 2007 UT App 390 at ¶ 6 (“[P]ublic
employees’ employment rights generally spring not from contract, but from
legislative policy.” (quoting Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 Utah App. 100, ¶ 8,
46 P.3d 247).
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D.

SALT LAKE CITY ACTED IN VIOLATION OF ITS OWN
ORDINANCES REQUIRING IT TO COMPLY WITH STATE
LAW.

City ordinances mandate that the City comply with state employment laws,
and they place an affirmative duty on the City to remedy any violations. Salt Lake
City Code §§ 2.53.020 and 2.53.030(A) expressly mandate that the City must
follow State requirements in City employment practices. Salt Lake City Code §
2.53.020 provides that it covers employment practices and decisions relating to the
City’s “classified career and civil service systems,” which it defines to mean
“those job positions in Salt Lake City government lawfully included in the
classified career and civil service system, as defined in title 10, chapter 3 of the
Utah Code Annotated, the City ordinances and City policies enacted pursuant
thereto.” (Emphasis added.) The Code further states, “[e]mployment decisions
and practices in Salt Lake City government’s classified civil or career service
systems that are contrary to state or federal law are prohibited.” Salt Lake City
Code § 2.53.030(A) (emphasis added). Thus, under the City’s own ordinances,
the City must comply with Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and City actions taken
contrary to those statutes are prohibited.
Further, if the City takes an unlawful employment action, City ordinances
impose an affirmative duty on the City to correct unlawful practices. Under Salt
Lake City Code § 2.53.060(A), “[i]f there has been a violation of this chapter,
corrective, curative, or preventive action shall be taken to ensure that violations of
this chapter, similar to those found, will not recur.” (Emphasis added). Among
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this section’s requirements, the employee “shall be provided relief, which may
include . . . 2. Cancellation of an unwarranted employment action; [and] 3.
Restoration of the employee to the position the employee would have occupied
absent the violation . . . .” Id. at 2.53.060(B) (emphasis added).
As demonstrated above, the City's efforts to make Howick's position at-will
violated the Utah Municipal Code and exceeded its authority and are void, and the
City’s own ordinances require compliance with State law. The Board's decision,
which was based entirely on Howick's allegedly at-will status, should therefore be
reversed, and Howick should be reinstated with back pay and benefits.
II.

HOWICK HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND SHOULD BE
REINSTATED.
A.

HOWICK HAS A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED
EMPLOYMENT.

This Court has "referred to public employment as a property right requiring
due process upon discharge." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm’n, 949
P.2d 746, 752 n.2 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't., 616
P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980)).10 “[P]ublic employees have a property interest in
continued employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued
employment absent ‘sufficient cause’ for discharge.” Lucas, 949 P.2d at 752
(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972).
10

“Utah’s constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the
due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.” In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (citing
Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm'n., 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942)).
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This Court in Lucas found that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 created a property
interest in continued employment for municipal police officers because it granted
civil service employees security against discharge without cause and that section
of State code “thus limits both the department head’s and the Commission’s
discretion in making employment decisions.” Lucas, 949 P.2d at 752-53.
Like Section 10-3-1012, Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 guarantee continued
employment for municipal employees by imposing limits on managerial
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1) provides, “[e]xcept as provided in
Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment without
limitation of time, being subject to discharge . . . only as provided in Section 10-31106.” Section 10-3-1106 limits a municipal employer’s discretion by providing
that employees may not be discharged for the reasons stated in Subsection (1) or
without sufficient cause pursuant to Subsection (3)(b).
Additional limitations on municipal action are imposed under an appeal
board’s rules and standards of review as established by city ordinance pursuant to
Section 10-3-1106(7). Under Salt Lake City Code ¶ 2.24.060, the Board must
determine whether an adverse action was warranted, meaning that the facts
support a need for “discipline or other remedial action,” and if so, whether the
action taken was proportionate to the charges. (Emphasis added.)
As demonstrated in Section I of this Brief, Howick is entitled to the
protections of Section 10-3-1106. She thus has a property interest – “a vested
right to continued employment absent a legal cause for termination.” Lucas, 949
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P.2d at 753. However, the City terminated Howick’s employment at-will, and the
Board denied jurisdiction based on her alleged at-will status. The Board denied
Howick due process that is constitutionally mandated to protect her property
interest when it upheld the City’s at-will termination of Howick's employment.11
Howick is therefore entitled to reinstatement.
B.

THE CITY AND BOARD VIOLATED HOWICK’S DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO FAIR PROCEDURES ADEQUATE TO
PROTECT A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED
EMPLOYMENT.

This Court has found that “[i]f a property interest in continued employment
exists, then the employee is entitled to procedures comporting with the minimum
requirements of due process, as provided in the Constitution.” Lucas, 949 P.2d at
752. In considering “what process is due” to protect a property interest in
continued employment, this Court has held that a deprivation must “‘be preceded
by notice and opportunity for hearing’ . . . [and this] is not a matter of legislative
grace, but of ‘constitutional guarantee.’” Lucas, 949 P.2d at 753 (citing Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57,
(1950)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487,
1492 (1985).
Specifically, this Court found that “before termination, minimum due
process entitles an employee to oral or written notice of the charges, an
11

“It is a clear abuse of discretion for . . . [an administrative body] to exercise its
discretion in such a way as to deny due process to a party appearing before it.”
Lucas, 949 P.2d at 754.
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explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to
present his or her side of the story in ‘something less’ than a full evidentiary
hearing.” Lucas, 949 P.2d at 753 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 545). When
state statutes also provide for a full post-termination hearing, “the Loudermill
Court also determined that due process . . . required a full, timely post-termination
hearing.” Id. The City and the Board failed to meet these procedural due process
requirements in Howick’s case, and the Board abused its discretion by, in effect,
allowing her at-will termination to stand despite a lack of due process.
1.

Howick Received No Pretermination Process.

The City insisted that Howick was an at-will employee and claimed that it
did not have to have a reason for the decision to terminate her employment. The
City thus gave her no notice of any charges against her and no explanation of a
basis for any charges or opportunity to tell her side of any story, as mandated
under Lucas and Loudermill. However, Howick was not an at-will employee, and
the City violated Howick's right to due process before her termination. The
Board's decision upheld this denial of due process.
2.

The City and Board Failed To Provide Post-Termination Due
Process.

The City and its Board also failed to provide constitutionally mandated
post-termination hearing procedures. Pretermination procedures must be “coupled
with a full post-termination hearing ‘at a meaningful time.’” Lucas, 949 P.2d at
754, (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-47).
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Initially, the Board’s staff denied Howick access to any post-termination
process based on a decision by the City Labor Relations Officer, who coordinates
and provides staff support to the Board under the Procedures. On appeal, this
Court pointed out that Howick had a right to obtain a determination from the
Board regarding its own jurisdiction and that the Labor Relations Officer had
interfered with that right.12
After this Court pointed out the City’s violation of Howick's rights, her
Notice of Appeal was given to the Board. However, the procedure employed by
the Board again circumvented any meaningful review. Essentially, the City asked
its Board to return the matter to this Court, and the Board did so. Thus, the Board
failed to provide constitutionally-mandated post termination due process.
3.

The City and Board Failed to Provide a Meaningful and Fair
Proceeding in Violation of Due Process Requirements.

The Board also abused its discretion and denied Howick due process by
failing to provide her with any meaningful review. “It is a clear abuse of

12

“Salt Lake City’s Employee Appeals Board procedures nowhere permit the
City’s Labor Relations Officer to issue final decisions regarding the Board’s
jurisdiction. Rather, those procedures allow the Board to request an opinion from
the City Attorney regarding questions of whether an employee is within the class
of persons who may appeal. See Salt Lake City Employee Board Procedures,
III(G), Appendix 2. Salt Lake City’s method of dealing with Howick’s notice of
appeal circumvents judicial review of the decision regarding the Board’s
jurisdiction by substituting a letter from the Labor Relations Officer for a final
administrative decision of the Board.” Howick, 2008 UT App 216. See also
Watson v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center, 75 F.3d 569, 580-81 (10th Cir. Utah
1996) (If an employer “agreed to follow a specific avenue to resolve the status of
plaintiff’s employment, and then actively interfered with that process, they
violated plaintiff’s right to procedural due process . . .”)
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discretion for an administrative body to exercise its discretion over the manner in
which it conducts its proceedings such that it denies due process to a party
appearing before it.” Tolman, 818 P.2d at 28.
This Court has stated that an employee can rely “upon any procedural
protections afforded by contract, ordinance, or state statute.” Lucas, 949 P.2d at
752. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that “every person who brings a claim in
a court or at a hearing held before an administrative agency has a due process right
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal.” Bunnell v. Industrial Comm’n of
Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987) (citing Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n,
696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985).
Due process requires certain safeguards. “At a minimum, timely and
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very
heart of procedural fairness.” In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876 (citations omitted).
“[T]hese protections are, indeed, fundamental rights which inure to the benefit of
every citizen of this state.” Id. at 877. Furthermore, “[f]airness requires not only
an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of
unfairness.” Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333 (emphasis added, quotation omitted).
Further, due process requires that an administrative body consider the legal
contentions of the party appearing before it. This Court has stated “an agency
must at some point address the legal issues raised by a party appearing before it.”
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31 (citing Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Central Weber Sewer
Improv. Dist., 287 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1955)). A determination must be prepared
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“in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the
ultimate conclusions.” Id. at 32 n.8. The failure to address “legal contentions [is]
. . . an abuse of discretion . . .” Id. at 32. Additionally, “the making of a clearly
erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or
misinterpreting the law.” Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
The Board's handling of Howick’s appeal did not provide to Howick a fair
and meaningful proceeding before a fair tribunal. The Board met twice for a
combined total of 21 minutes. R. 8-25; R. Exhibit A. It permitted Howick no
participation in the proceeding other than the right to submit "written
documentation" to its first meeting, although the City’s representative was present
during at least one Board meeting.13 R. 104. Howick submitted her legal
contentions to the Board. R. 47-68. Without addressing Howick’s legal
contentions, the City argued that the Board should simply accept the City’s
unlawful classification and allow this Court to consider Howick's contentions on
appeal. R. 27-46.
In response, the Board requested a legal opinion from the City Attorney,
who recused himself and selected Preston to provide the requested legal opinion.
R. 94-95. Preston opined that the City’s actions were legal without ever
addressing Howick’s contentions regarding the City’s authority and the
requirements of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106. R. 82-87. Three of the five Board

13

The City’s Director of Human Resources, who has no role in the Board process,
attended at least the Board’s first meeting. R. 100.
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members then met and adopted Preston’s opinion in the Board’s second meeting,
which lasted approximately two minutes. The Board adopted the opinion through
a verbal vote instead of a secret ballot as required by Section 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i).
R. Exhibit A at 3. Preston’s opinion was in error, but Howick never even saw the
Preston opinion until the City produced the record to her three weeks after the
Board rendered its decision. Appendix 5.
These proceedings did not provide Howick any “opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful way.” In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876. The Board never considered
Howick’s legal contentions as it must. See Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31. The Board’s
determination does not “demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the
ultimate conclusions.” Id. at 32 n.8. By failing to provide a fair and meaningful
proceeding to Howick, the Board abused its discretion.
The City has twice demonstrated that it will not provide due process to
Howick. However, in this case, the Court’s decision about the legality of treating
Howick as an at-will employee will resolve all issues before the Board. For that
reason, the Board’s decision regarding Howick's status as an at-will employee
should be overturned, and Howick reinstated to her position.
III.

HOWICK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.
Howick is entitled to the protections of Section 10-3-1106, and the actions

of the City, its Board and Board staff exceeded and violated the Utah Municipal
Code and Howick’s constitutional rights to due process. Therefore, this Court
should award Howick attorney fees pursuant to the legal doctrines set forth below.
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A.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO
HOWICK UNDER ITS INHERENT POWER IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY BASED ON THE
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE.

Under their inherent power to award attorney fees in the interest of justice
and equity, “[c]ourts have also awarded attorney fees to a party as a private
attorney general when the vindication of a strong or societally important public
policy takes place and the necessary costs in doing so transcend the individual
plaintiff’s pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.” Stewart, 885
P.2d at 783 (quotations omitted).14 This Court has stated that under this doctrine it
determines whether a legal action “vindicated 'a strong or societally important
public policy;' whether 'the necessary costs in doing so transcend[ed] [Plaintiffs’]
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization;' and whether this case is
exceptional such that an award of fees is appropriate under the private attorney
general doctrine.” Culbertson, 2008 UT App. 22, at ¶ 10 (quoting Utahns for
Better Dental Health-Davis Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97, ¶ 5, 175 P.3d
1036).
Under the first of these factors, vindication of a strong or societally
important public policy, this Court has found that the requirement is met when an
action is brought not only to protect a party’s property, “but also to require

14

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that when an issue is presented to an
appellate court, “an issue need not [first] be presented to an administrative agency
if it cannot properly decide the issue.” Stewart, 885 P.2d at 781. The Board
cannot award attorney’s fees or costs. Procedures I, C, Appendix 2.
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[government] . . . to abide by its own ordinances . . . Such motivation serves the
important public policy of ‘ensur[ing] that [government is] . . . governed by the
rule of law, not of man.’” Culbertson, 2008 UT App 22 at ¶ 12 (quoting Fox v.
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)). This Court
noted that, as in this case, a private action can serve to curb government’s “willful
disregard of its own ordinances and procedures[,]” and to prevent government
officials from “willfully disregarding . . . ordinances to obtain their own economic
advantage.” Id. at ¶¶ 13 and 14. This is particularly important where a party has
sought “to resolve this issue without litigation, yet their efforts were rebuffed.” Id.
at ¶ 15. A private legal action benefits “a large number of citizens” when it forces
government “to abide by the rule of law when no other avenue toward that end had
been successful.” Id. at ¶ 15
Howick’s action serves such a purpose, and vindicates an important public
policy. It demonstrates that cities cannot disregard legislative limitations on their
powers and violate the law. “All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are
void.” ). “[T]he exercise of a [City’s] delegated power is subject to the
limitations imposed by state statutes and state and federal constitutions.” Harding
v. Alpine City, 656 P.2d at 986. Further, the court has “a duty to invalidate” acts
that exceed a city’s powers. Lorenc, 789 P.2d at 49.
Howick’s case also vindicates important public policies regarding
employment. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an employee’s property
right to work and receive compensation for work is “one of the most important of
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the liberties vouched safe to one in our society. It was so regarded by the framers
of our state constitution. Article XII, § 19.” Backman v. Bateman, 263 P.2d 561,
563 (Utah 1953). The court declared that these rights “are of paramount
importance and that they should be safeguarded to the highest possible degree
consistent with the public good.” Id. Further, cities have an “obligation to comply
with the statutory provisions . . . [in their policies and in] dealing with employees,”
and employees have the “right to expect” that they will. Thurston, 892 P.2d at
1038.
Further, Howick’s action vindicates important public policies requiring that
the City provide due process. Consistent with the first factor in Culbertson,
Howick sought to discuss the illegal nature of the City’s termination action with
the City Attorney several times but was rebuffed in her efforts. She then sought to
use the City’s administrative process to address this matter, but the Board’s staff
refused to provide Howick access to that process despite the clear requirements of
the Board’s own Procedures. See Procedures III, G, Appendix 2. After this Court
pointed out this clear violation,15 Howick’s Notice of Appeal was given to the
Board. However, Howick's participation in the appeal was limited to submitting
written documentation of her position. The Board sought and obtained a legal
opinion, which failed to address Howick's legal contentions. Nevertheless, three
Board members met and adopted that opinion in a meeting lasting approximately

15

See Howick, 2008 UT App 216.
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two minutes. As demonstrated in Section II above, the City denied Howick due
process at every step, both before and after the termination of her employment.
Under the second factor of Culbertson, the court examines whether the
necessary costs in pursuing this matter transcend Howick’s pecuniary interest to
an extent requiring subsidization. This matter has created severe hardships for
Howick, yet this kind of harm is very difficult and expensive to remedy. An
employee must bring a challenge to vindicate these rights at a time when the
employee, who is without a job and therefore without an income, is least able to
pursue it. Raising a challenge creates severe stress and difficulty for the employee
and places at risk the employee’s ability to return to the workplace or find other
employment. Meanwhile, the City is free to continue to insist on illegal action
without suffering similar impacts, and with adequate funding to draw out the
process and escalate its difficulties.
Further, Howick’s position is one of numerous City positions that are
subject to an illegal at-will designation, and thus Howick’s action will benefit
similarly situated employees and act as a deterrent to future illegal City actions.
The City’s Unclassified Compensation Plan, which has now been combined with
the City’s Executive Compensation Plan, was created to cover these illegally
classified positions, and these plans were drafted without regard for the statutory
provisions of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.16 Meanwhile, employees seeking to

16

The City combined its Unclassified Compensation Plan and Executive
Compensation Plan in July of 2008. See supra note 2 at 5 and Appendix 3. The
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vindicate these important rights face strong financial and personal disincentives,
and the City’s classifications, ordinances, policies, procedures, and contracts have
previously gone without challenge.17 This action will make it less likely that
municipal employees, including others at the City, will be subjected to illegal
classifications by their employers or be subjected to deliberately protracted and
improper processes if they seek to vindicate their rights.
Under the third factor in Culbertson, this case is extraordinary. Howick
sought to address obvious problems with the City’s action without bringing any
legal action at all, but the City refused even to respond. Howick then sought to
resolve this matter through the legislatively-mandated administrative process,
which requires an appeal board to render a decision within fifteen days. In
new Executive Compensation Plan claims to apply to “Elected Officials and those
full-time City employees classified as ‘Appointed’ employees,” which it defines to
be “’at-will’ employees serving at the pleasure of the Mayor . . .” Executive
Compensation Plan, Section II, Appendix 3. The plan lists all of these positions in
Appendix A under Levels 001-017 and 097-099. That list not only appears to
contain numerous positions that do not comply with the requirements of Sections
10-3-1105 and 1106, it contains five levels which state “Appointments Pending”
rather than designating existing positions. It thus appears that the City has
retained and intends to include even more illegally classified positions in its newly
revised plan despite the fact that when the City adopted this compensation plan in
July 2008, Howick had been pointing out the illegal nature of the City’s
classifications for nearly a year.
17

The City’s newly combined Executive Compensation Plan makes it even less
feasible for an employee to challenge the City’s illegal classifications. In Section
XVI of the plan, the City provides for severance pay for “appointed employees”
who are terminated without cause, but only if they “execute a release of all claims
approved by the City Attorney’s Office.” Executive Compensation Plan,
Appendix 3. Employees thus must choose between challenging an illegal
classification, or receiving severance income after losing their jobs.
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response, the City willfully disregarded its own requirements and State law by
denying Howick access to the Board. Once this Court pointed out the City’s
violation, the City then provided for a meaningless process designed to return the
matter to this Court.
The Legislature mandates a speedy and cost-effective process for
determining these disputes affecting the property rights and income of municipal
employees, but the City’s deliberate actions have instead forced Howick to incur
many tens of thousands of dollars in expense and to spend over a year pursuing a
vindication of her rights. The City made a deliberate choice to engage in
protracted litigation in an effort to waste Howick’s resources and coerce her
acceptance of the City’s wrongful actions, and these choices were made by the
City Attorney and management personnel at the highest levels. The City was
unwilling “to respond in a meaningful way to [Howick’s] prelitigation claims and
its engagement in this protracted litigation distinguishes this case from the run of
the mill dispute between a public entity and members of the public.” Culbertson,
2008 UT App at ¶ 18. Howick thus has met this Court’s three factors, and is
entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.18

18

Howick is prepared to submit to this Court an affidavit of attorney fees and
costs incurred in connection with seeking review of the decision to terminate her
employment and vindication of statutory and constitutional rights. When this
Court has original jurisdiction of a matter, it has referred factual issues to the
District Court for appropriate proceedings. See Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons,
808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991).
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B.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO
HOWICK UNDER ITS INHERENT POWER IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY BASED ON ACTS BY
THE CITY IN BAD FAITH, VEXATIOUSLY, WANTONLY
OR FOR OPPRESSIVE REASONS.

Under this Court’s equitable powers, it may also award attorney fees when
a party acts “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 (citing James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
P 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)). Stewart does not define bad faith, but cases in other
contexts offer guidance. In defining bad faith in a statutory context, the court held
that these terms imply action that is willful or dishonest, involves “some motive of
self-interest,” or involves a “deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a
belief or fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect -- that is to say, where
there is an intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the ears.” Research
Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted).
In defining bad faith in the analogous context of awarding attorneys fees
under Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-825, the Utah Supreme Court has defined good faith
as “(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent
to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of
the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others.” Still
Standing Stable, LLC. v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ¶ 12, 122 P.3d 556 (quoting In Re:
Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 Utah 3, ¶ 48, 86 P.3d 712. When any one of
these factors is lacking a party has acted in bad faith. Id.
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The facts of this case demonstrate conduct that it is in bad faith, vexatious,
wanton and for oppressive reasons. The City’s actions show a “deliberate desire
to evade knowledge” and to “close its eyes” as the City Attorney and the City
Labor Relations Officer repeatedly rebuffed Howick’s requests to examine the
law. See Research Planning, Inc., 690 P.2d at 1132. The City could not have had
“an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question” when, among other
things, the City Attorney refused to examine the law, the original Labor Relations
Officer obtained Howick’s job description rather than following the Board’s own
Procedures, and the acting Labor Relations Officer also refused to follow the
Board’s Procedures and circumvented the jurisdiction of this Court. See Still
Standing Stable, LLC, 2005 UT 46 at ¶ 12.
These actions further demonstrate an intent to “take unconscionable
advantage of others[,]” and that the City had a knowledge and intent of activities
that would “hinder, delay or defraud others.” Id. at ¶ 12. Both State statute and
City procedures require an expedited process of fifteen days when an employee
appeals to the Board.19 Yet the City refused to comply with the law, and through
its deliberate efforts to create delay, it greatly increased the time and expense
necessary for Howick to obtain a review and decision.
The City took these actions despite the fact that the courts have recognized
the significance of determining public employment rights. The Utah Supreme
19

See Section 10-3-1106(3)(a), (3)(b)(i) and (ii), and (5)(a)(i) and (ii). See also
Procedures III, F; III G; and IV, A, Appendix 2.
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Court noted that employment property rights “are of paramount importance and
that they should be safeguarded to the highest possible degree consistent with the
public good.” Backman, 263 P.2d at 563.
The City also acted despite the fact that the courts have recognized the
hardships associated with improper employment actions. Terminated employees
are in a “particularly vulnerable position.” Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828,
840 (Utah 1992). The employee may be subjected to a “lengthy wait for
vindication, and to the attendant and often traumatic disruptions to his personal
and economic life.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 549 (J. Marshall concurrence).
“During this period the employee is left in limbo[.]” Id. It is “in no respect
certain” that even a prompt post-deprivation hearing will make him or her whole –
“the wrongfully discharged employee will almost inevitably suffer irreparable
injury.” Id. at 550. “Of perhaps equal concern, the personal trauma experienced
during the long months in which the employee awaits decision, during which he
suffers doubt, humiliation, and the loss of an opportunity to perform work, will
never be recompensed, and indeed probably could not be with dollars alone.” Id.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the effects of an arbitrary
termination are “far-reaching and drastic” on the lives of “capable and faithful
public employees who have given many years to a particular job.” Backman, 263
P.2d at 564.
The City’s actions in this case are egregious, and they constitute conduct
that is in bad faith, vexatious, wanton or for oppressive reasons. These actions
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have imposed severe hardship and expense on Howick, and have created the very
hazards that Utah courts and the United States Supreme Court have spoken against
so strongly. The City pursued this course despite the fiduciary nature of its
obligations to comply with the law and properly administer employment rights,
including through the City’s Board process. Therefore, the City’s actions meet the
test stated in Stewart, and this Court should exercise its inherent equitable power
and award attorney fees to Howick.
C.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO
HOWICK UNDER THE DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution also provides for the
award of attorney fees in this appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has found that the
Due Process Clause of Article I, § 7 is self-executing, and that “self-executing
constitutional provisions allow for awards of money damages.” Spackman, 2000
UT 87 at ¶ 19 (quotations ommitted). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
“judicial tradition gives [a court] the authority to do this under appropriate
circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 21. See also Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 22, 184
P.3d 592 (stating that in Spackman the Supreme Court “noted that the common
law gives the judiciary authority to provide civil remedies for constitutional
violations under appropriate circumstances.”)
The court in Spackman stated that in a tort suit for damages three elements
must be established, and those elements may be applied here. “First, a plaintiff
must establish that he or she suffered a ‘flagrant’ violation of his or her
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constitutional rights.” Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at ¶ 23. As discussed in Section II
of this Brief, Howick suffered a flagrant violation of her constitutional rights to
receive due process of law under the U.S. Constitution and under Article I, § 7 of
the Utah Constitution. The City’s actions twice deliberately denied due process to
Howick despite the requirements of Section 10-3-1106 and the City’s own
Procedures mandating a fast and cost-effective process. As a result, Howick was
instead forced to pursue an expensive and lengthy process to obtain a fair review.
This Court has stated that the City’s actions were not permitted by its own
Procedures and that they circumvented judicial review. Howick, 2008 UT App
216.
The Spackman court stated that “[s]econd, a plaintiff must establish that
existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries.” Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at ¶
24. This appeal is not a suit for damages. The remedy available in this appeal is
reinstatement, but Howick has incurred many tens of thousands of dollars in legal
fees and expenses due to the City’s illegal actions. The existing remedy does not
redress Howick’s injuries; if she is reinstated, she will have to spend a substantial
portion of her annual government salary to pay expenses that the City illegally
forced her to incur. The harm is not remedied in this case if Howick retains her
job, but at a cost she can ill afford.
Finally, the Spackman court stated that “[t]hird, a plaintiff must establish
that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect
the plaintiff’s rights or redress his or her injuries.” Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at
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¶ 25. As discussed in the foregoing paragraph, restoring Howick’s job does not
make her whole if she must incur the cost of correcting the City’s deliberate and
illegal conduct. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the constitutional rights that
individuals hold in their employment under the Utah Constitution include “[t]he
right to work, the right to engage in gainful occupations, [and] the right to receive
compensation for one’s work. . .” Backman, 263 P.2d at 562-63 (emphasis
added). Non-monetary equitable relief alone will be wholly inadequate to protect
Howick’s constitutional rights in her employment under the Utah Constitution,
including her right to receive compensation for her work.
The Utah Supreme Court has not limited an award of damages for a
violation of Utah’s constitutional due process requirements to cases arising in a
particular forum. The Court stated that these damages may be awarded in
“appropriate circumstances” at a court’s discretion. Under this flexible standard,
damages may be applied to a matter arising before an appeal board that must be
appealed to this Court due to a flagrant denial of due process. Howick’s
circumstances meet the test established by the Utah Supreme Court to obtain an
award of attorney fees as damages under the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution, and this Court should award her attorney fees on that basis.
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Howick was wrongfully terminated from her position as an attorney for Salt
Lake City solely on the basis of her allegedly at-will status in excess of the City's
statutory authority and in violation of the Utah Municipal code. Howick was also
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denied constitutionally mandated due process to protect her property interest in her
employment both before and after the termination of that employment, and by the
manner in which the City, its Board and staff conducted the proceedings. Howick
therefore requests that this Court:
1.

Reverse the decision of the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board

and reinstate her to her position in the Salt Lake City Attorney’s Office because
she was a City employee entitled to the protections of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-31105 and 1106, and because her due process rights have been violated by the City
and the Board; and
2.

Award her attorneys fees and costs incurred in connection with

seeking review of the decision to terminate her employment and vindication of
statutory and constitutional rights on the bases set forth in Section III above.
Dated this ______ day of October, 2008.

Elizabeth T. Dunning
Attorney for Petitioner Jodi Howick
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3.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _____ day of October, 2008, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners Brief was hand delivered to:
W. Mark Gavre
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation

______________________________________
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